### Post-Quantum Anonymous Veto Networks

Jintai Ding, Doug Emery, Johannes Mueller, Peter Y. A. Ryan, and Vonn Kee Wong

##### Abstract

Anonymous veto networks (AV-nets), originally proposed by Hao and Zielinski (2006), are particularly lightweight protocols for evaluating a veto function in a peer-to-peer network such that anonymity of all protocol participants is preserved. Prior to this work, anonymity in all AV-nets from the literature relied on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption and can thus be broken by (scalable) quantum computers. In order to defend against this threat, we propose two practical and completely lattice-based AV-nets. The first one is secure against passive and the second one is secure against active adversaries. We prove that anonymity of our AV-nets reduces to the ring learning with errors (RLWE) assumption. As such, our AV-nets are the first ones with post-quantum anonymity. We also provide performance benchmarks to demonstrate their practicality.

Available format(s)
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MINOR revision.E-Vote-ID 2020
Contact author(s)
johannes mueller @ uni lu
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2020/1023

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1023,
author = {Jintai Ding and Doug Emery and Johannes Mueller and Peter Y.  A.  Ryan and Vonn Kee Wong},
title = {Post-Quantum Anonymous Veto Networks},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2020/1023},
year = {2020},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1023}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1023}
}

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