Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1023

Post-Quantum Anonymous Veto Networks

Jintai Ding and Doug Emery and Johannes Mueller and Peter Y. A. Ryan and Vonn Kee Wong

Abstract: Anonymous veto networks (AV-nets), originally proposed by Hao and Zielinski (2006), are particularly lightweight protocols for evaluating a veto function in a peer-to-peer network such that anonymity of all protocol participants is preserved. Prior to this work, anonymity in all AV-nets from the literature relied on the decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption and can thus be broken by (scalable) quantum computers. In order to defend against this threat, we propose two practical and completely lattice-based AV-nets. The first one is secure against passive and the second one is secure against active adversaries. We prove that anonymity of our AV-nets reduces to the ring learning with errors (RLWE) assumption. As such, our AV-nets are the first ones with post-quantum anonymity. We also provide performance benchmarks to demonstrate their practicality.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / post-quantum lattice-based anonymous veto protocol voting verifiability privacy

Original Publication (with minor differences): E-Vote-ID 2020

Date: received 25 Aug 2020

Contact author: johannes mueller at uni lu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200827:022808 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1023


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