Paper 2020/1021
Consensus Redux: Distributed Ledgers in the Face of Adversarial Supremacy
Abstract
Permissionless distributed ledgers, such as those arising from blockchain protocols, have been touted as the centerpiece of an upcoming security-critical information technology infrastructure. Their basic properties---consistency and liveness---can be guaranteed under specific constraints on the resources available to an adversary relative to the resources of the participants that follow the protocol. Given their permissionless participation convention and their intended long-livedness, a critical open security question is their behavior---and potential resilience---to temporary spikes in adversarial resources. In this work we give the first thorough treatment of the self-healing properties of Nakamoto ledgers, addressing both proof-of-work (PoW) and proof-of-stake (PoS) protocols. First, we present a unified model that allows us to define self-healing for both of these protocol classes. Then we provide a formal analysis establishing self-healing with respect to both consistency and liveness in both classes, quantifying the resulting vulnerability period as a function of the magnitude of the spike. Finally, we provide numerical simulations giving explicit quantitative bounds relevant for practice.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. Computer Security Foundations (CSF) 2024
- Keywords
- blockchainself-healingproof-of-workproof-of-stake
- Contact author(s)
-
christian badertscher @ iohk io
peter gazi @ iohk io
akiayias @ inf ed ac uk
acr @ cse uconn edu - History
- 2025-08-08: revised
- 2020-08-27: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/1021
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/1021,
author = {Christian Badertscher and Peter Gaži and Aggelos Kiayias and Alexander Russell and Vassilis Zikas},
title = {Consensus Redux: Distributed Ledgers in the Face of Adversarial Supremacy},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/1021},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/1021}
}