Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2020/1014

GANRED: GAN-based Reverse Engineering of DNNs via Cache Side-Channel

Yuntao Liu and Ankur Srivastava

Abstract: In recent years, deep neural networks (DNN) have become an important type of intellectual property due to their high performance on various classification tasks. As a result, DNN stealing attacks have emerged. Many attack surfaces have been exploited, among which cache timing side-channel attacks are hugely problematic because they do not need physical probing or direct interaction with the victim to estimate the DNN model. However, existing cache-side-channel-based DNN reverse engineering attacks rely on analyzing the binary code of the DNN library that must be shared between the attacker and the victim in the main memory. In reality, the DNN library code is often inaccessible because 1) the code is proprietary, or 2) memory sharing has been disabled by the operating system. In our work, we propose GANRED, an attack approach based on the generative adversarial nets (GAN) framework which utilizes cache timing side-channel information to accurately recover the structure of DNNs without memory sharing or code access. The benefit of GANRED is four-fold. 1) There is no need for DNN library code analysis. 2) No shared main memory segment between the victim and the attacker is needed. 3) Our attack locates the exact structure of the victim model, unlike existing attacks which only narrow down the structure search space. 4) Our attack efficiently scales to deeper DNNs, exhibiting only linear growth in the number of layers in the victim DNN.

Category / Keywords: applications / Deep Neural Networks, Reverse Engineering, Cache Side-Channel, Prime+Probe

Date: received 22 Aug 2020

Contact author: ytliu at umd edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20200822:215851 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2020/1014


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