Paper 2020/052
Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Tweakable TWINE
Mohamed Tolba, Muhammad ElSheikh, and Amr M. Youssef
Abstract
Tweakable TWINE (T-TWINE) is a new lightweight tweakable block cipher family proposed by Sakamoto $et$ $al$. at IWSEC 2019. T-TWINE is the first Tweakable Block Cipher (TBC) that is built on Generalized Feistel Structure (GFS). It is based on the TWINE block cipher in addition to a simple tweak scheduling based on SKINNY’s tweakey schedule. Similar to TWINE, it has two versions, namely, T-TWINE-80 and T-TWINE-128, both have a block length of 64 bits and employ keys of length 80 and 128 bits, respectively. In this paper, we present impossible differential attacks against reduced-round versions of T-TWINE-80 and T-TWINE-128. First, we present an 18-round impossible differential distinguisher against T-TWINE. Then, using this distinguisher, we attack 25 and 27 rounds of T-TWINE-80 and T-TWINE-128, respectively.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- CryptanalysisImpossible differential attacksTweakableBlock ciphersTWINET-TWINE
- Contact author(s)
- m_elshei @ encs concordia ca
- History
- 2020-01-17: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2020/052
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2020/052,
author = {Mohamed Tolba and Muhammad ElSheikh and Amr M. Youssef},
title = {Impossible Differential Cryptanalysis of Reduced-Round Tweakable {TWINE}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2020/052},
year = {2020},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2020/052}
}
