Paper 2019/946

Dynamically Obfuscated Scan Chain To Resist Oracle-Guided Attacks On Logic Locked Design

M Sazadur Rahman, Adib Nahiyan, Sarah Amir, Fahim Rahman, Farimah Farahmandi, Domenic Forte, and Mark Tehranipoor

Abstract

Logic locking has emerged as a promising solution against IP piracy and modification by untrusted entities in the integrated circuit design process. However, its security is challenged by boolean satisfiability (SAT) based attacks. Criteria that are critical to SAT attack success on obfuscated circuits includes scan architecture access to the attacker and/or that the circuit under attack is combinational. To address this issue, we propose a dynamically-obfuscated scan chain (DOSC) technique in resisting SAT attack in an obfuscated sequential design by restricting scan access only to authorized users.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Applications
Publication info
Preprint. Minor revision.
Keywords
SAT attackLogic lockingSecure scanSequential circuit unrollingObfuscation
Contact author(s)
mohammad rahman @ ufl edu
History
2019-08-19: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/946
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/946,
      author = {M Sazadur Rahman and Adib Nahiyan and Sarah Amir and Fahim Rahman and Farimah Farahmandi and Domenic Forte and Mark Tehranipoor},
      title = {Dynamically Obfuscated Scan Chain To Resist Oracle-Guided Attacks On Logic Locked Design},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/946},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/946}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/946}
}
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