Paper 2019/901

Improvements in Everlasting Privacy: Efficient and Secure Zero Knowledge Proofs

Thomas Haines and Clementine Gritti

Abstract

Verifiable electronic voting promises to ensure the correctness of elections even in the presence of a corrupt authority, while providing strong privacy guarantees. However, few practical systems with end-to-end verifiability are expected to offer long term privacy, let alone guarantee it. Since good guarantees of privacy are essential to the democratic process, good guarantees of everlasting privacy must be a major goal of secure online voting systems. Various currently proposed solutions rely on unusual constructions whose security has not been established. Further, the cost of verifying the zero knowledge proofs of other solutions has only been partially analysed. Our work builds upon Moran and Naor's solution---and its extensions, applications and generalisations---to present a scheme which is additively homomorphic, efficient to verify, and rests upon well studied assumptions.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MAJOR revision.Fourth International Joint Conference on Electronic Voting (E-Vote-Id 2019)
Keywords
VotingEverlasting PrivacyZero Knowledge Proofs
Contact author(s)
thomas haines @ ntnu no
History
2019-08-08: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/901
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/901,
      author = {Thomas Haines and Clementine Gritti},
      title = {Improvements in Everlasting Privacy: Efficient and Secure Zero Knowledge Proofs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/901},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/901}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/901}
}
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