Paper 2019/890
An Adaptive Attack on 2-SIDH
Samuel Dobson, Steven D. Galbraith, Jason LeGrow, Yan Bo Ti, and Lukas Zobernig
Abstract
We present a polynomial-time adaptive attack on the 2-SIDH protocol. The 2-SIDH protocol is a special instance of the countermeasure proposed by Azarderakhsh, Jao and Leonardi to perform isogeny-based key exchange with static keys in the presence of an adaptive attack. This countermeasure has also been recently explicitly proposed by Kayacan. Our attack extends the adaptive attack by Galbraith, Petit, Shani and Ti (GPST) to recover a static secret key using malformed points. The extension of GPST is non-trivial and requires learning additional information. In particular, the attack needs to recover intermediate elliptic curves in the isogeny path, and points on them. We also discuss how to extend the attack to k-SIDH when k > 2 and explain that the attack complexity is exponential in k.
Note: Updated paper.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- cryptanalysissupersingular isogeny Diffie-Hellman
- Contact author(s)
-
samuel dobson nz @ gmail com
s galbraith @ auckland ac nz
jlegrow @ waterloo ca
yanbo ti @ gmail com
lukas zobernig @ auckland ac nz - History
- 2020-09-05: last of 4 revisions
- 2019-08-05: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/890
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/890,
author = {Samuel Dobson and Steven D. Galbraith and Jason LeGrow and Yan Bo Ti and Lukas Zobernig},
title = {An Adaptive Attack on 2-{SIDH}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/890},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/890}
}
