Paper 2019/854
Reducing the Cost of Implementing AES as a Quantum Circuit
Brandon Langenberg, Hai Pham, and Rainer Steinwandt
Abstract
To quantify security levels in a post-quantum scenario, it is common to use the quantum resources needed to attack AES as a reference value. Specifically, in NIST’s ongoing post-quantum standardization effort, different security categories are defined that reflect the quantum resources needed to attack AES-128, AES-192, and AES-256. This paper presents a quantum circuit to implement the S-box of AES. Leveraging also an improved implementation of the key expansion, we identify new quantum circuits for all three AES key lengths. For AES-128, the number of Toffoli gates can be reduced by more than 88% compared to Almazrooie et al.'s and Grassl et al.'s estimates, while simultaneously reducing the number of qubits. Our circuits can be used to simplify a Grover-based key search for AES.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- quantum cryptanalysisquantum circuitGrover’s algorithmAES
- Contact author(s)
-
brandon langenberg @ pqsecurity com
hpham9 @ fau edu
rsteinwa @ fau edu - History
- 2019-07-23: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/854
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/854, author = {Brandon Langenberg and Hai Pham and Rainer Steinwandt}, title = {Reducing the Cost of Implementing {AES} as a Quantum Circuit}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/854}, year = {2019}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/854} }