Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/853

A critique of game-based definitions of receipt-freeness for voting

Ashley Fraser and Elizabeth A. Quaglia and Ben Smyth

Abstract: We analyse three game-based definitions of receipt-freeness; uncovering soundness issues with two of the definitions and completeness issues with all three. Hence, two of the definitions are too weak, i.e., satisfiable by voting schemes that are not intuitively receipt-free. More precisely, those schemes need not even satisfy ballot secrecy. Consequently, the definitions are satisfiable by schemes that reveal how voters' vote. Moreover, we find that each definition is limited in scope. Beyond soundness and completeness issues, we show that each definition captures a different attacker model and we examine some of those differences.

Category / Keywords: E-voting, receipt-freeness, privacy, game-based definitions, computational security

Original Publication (with major differences): The 13th International Conference on Provable and Practical Security (ProvSec 2019)

Date: received 22 Jul 2019

Contact author: Ashley Fraser 2016 at live rhul ac uk

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190723:111653 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/853


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