Paper 2019/853

A critique of game-based definitions of receipt-freeness for voting

Ashley Fraser, Elizabeth A. Quaglia, and Ben Smyth


We analyse three game-based definitions of receipt-freeness; uncovering soundness issues with two of the definitions and completeness issues with all three. Hence, two of the definitions are too weak, i.e., satisfiable by voting schemes that are not intuitively receipt-free. More precisely, those schemes need not even satisfy ballot secrecy. Consequently, the definitions are satisfiable by schemes that reveal how voters' vote. Moreover, we find that each definition is limited in scope. Beyond soundness and completeness issues, we show that each definition captures a different attacker model and we examine some of those differences.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MAJOR revision.The 13th International Conference on Provable and Practical Security (ProvSec 2019)
E-votingreceipt-freenessprivacygame-based definitionscomputational security
Contact author(s)
Ashley Fraser 2016 @ live rhul ac uk
2019-07-23: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Ashley Fraser and Elizabeth A.  Quaglia and Ben Smyth},
      title = {A critique of game-based definitions of receipt-freeness for voting},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/853},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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