Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/828

Optimal Collision Side-Channel Attacks

Cezary Glowacz and Vincent Grosso

Abstract: Collision side-channel attacks are efficient attacks against cryptographic implementations, however, optimal collision side-channel attacks and how to compute them efficiently is an open question. In this paper, we show that collision side-channel attacks can be derived using the maximum likelihood principle when the distribution of the values of the leakage function is known. This allows us to exhibit the optimal collision side-channel attack and its efficient computation. Finally, we are able to compute an upper bound for the success rate of the optimal post-processing strategy, and we show that our method and the optimal strategy have success rates close to each other. Attackers can benefit from our method as we present an efficient collision side-channel attack. Evaluators can benefit from our method as we present a tight upper bound for the success rate of the optimal strategy.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Side-channel analysis, side-channel security evaluation, collision attacks

Date: received 17 Jul 2019, last revised 28 Jul 2019

Contact author: vincent grosso at univ-st-etienne fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: Minor correction.

Version: 20190728:090909 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/828


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