Paper 2019/828
Optimal Collision Side-Channel Attacks
Cezary Glowacz and Vincent Grosso
Abstract
Collision side-channel attacks are efficient attacks against cryptographic implementations, however, optimal collision side-channel attacks and how to compute them efficiently is an open question. In this paper, we show that collision side-channel attacks can be derived using the maximum likelihood principle when the distribution of the values of the leakage function is known. This allows us to exhibit the optimal collision side-channel attack and its efficient computation. Finally, we are able to compute an upper bound for the success rate of the optimal post-processing strategy, and we show that our method and the optimal strategy have success rates close to each other. Attackers can benefit from our method as we present an efficient collision side-channel attack. Evaluators can benefit from our method as we present a tight upper bound for the success rate of the optimal strategy.
Note: Derivation of optimal distunguisher for profiled side channel attacks added. The derivation treats jointly the profile and attacks phases.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Implementation
- Publication info
- Preprint.
- Keywords
- Side-channel analysisside-channel security evaluationcollision attacks
- Contact author(s)
- vincent grosso @ univ-st-etienne fr
- History
- 2020-07-29: last of 3 revisions
- 2019-07-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/828
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/828,
author = {Cezary Glowacz and Vincent Grosso},
title = {Optimal Collision Side-Channel Attacks},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/828},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/828}
}
