Paper 2019/828

Optimal Collision Side-Channel Attacks

Cezary Glowacz and Vincent Grosso


Collision side-channel attacks are efficient attacks against cryptographic implementations, however, optimal collision side-channel attacks and how to compute them efficiently is an open question. In this paper, we show that collision side-channel attacks can be derived using the maximum likelihood principle when the distribution of the values of the leakage function is known. This allows us to exhibit the optimal collision side-channel attack and its efficient computation. Finally, we are able to compute an upper bound for the success rate of the optimal post-processing strategy, and we show that our method and the optimal strategy have success rates close to each other. Attackers can benefit from our method as we present an efficient collision side-channel attack. Evaluators can benefit from our method as we present a tight upper bound for the success rate of the optimal strategy.

Note: Derivation of optimal distunguisher for profiled side channel attacks added. The derivation treats jointly the profile and attacks phases.

Available format(s)
Publication info
Side-channel analysisside-channel security evaluationcollision attacks
Contact author(s)
vincent grosso @ univ-st-etienne fr
2020-07-29: last of 3 revisions
2019-07-18: received
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      author = {Cezary Glowacz and Vincent Grosso},
      title = {Optimal Collision Side-Channel Attacks},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/828},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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