Paper 2019/772
Mixture Integral Attacks on Reduced-Round AES with a Known/Secret S-Box
Lorenzo Grassi and Markus Schofnegger
Abstract
In this work, we present new low-data secret-key distinguishers and key-recovery attacks on reduced-round AES. The starting point of our work is “Mixture Differential Cryptanalysis” recently introduced at FSE/ToSC 2019, a way to turn the “multiple-of-8” 5-round AES secret-key distinguisher presented at Eurocrypt 2017 into a simpler and more convenient one (though, on a smaller number of rounds). By reconsidering this result on a smaller number of rounds, we present as our main contribution a new secret-key distinguisher on 3-round AES with the smallest data complexity in the literature (that does not require adaptive chosen plaintexts/ciphertexts), i.e. approximately half of the data necessary to set up a 3-round truncated differential distinguisher (which is currently the distinguisher in the literature with the lowest data complexity). E.g. for a probability of success of 95%, our distinguisher requires just 10 chosen plaintexts versus 20 chosen plaintexts necessary to set up the truncated differential one. Besides that, we present new competitive low-data key-recovery attacks on 3- and 4-round AES, both in the case in which the S-Box is known and in the case in which it is secret.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Minor revision. INDOCRYPT 2020
- Keywords
- AESMixture Differential CryptanalysisSecret-Key DistinguisherLow-Data AttackSecret S-Box
- Contact author(s)
- lgrassi @ science ru nl
- History
- 2020-12-16: revised
- 2019-07-02: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/772
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/772, author = {Lorenzo Grassi and Markus Schofnegger}, title = {Mixture Integral Attacks on Reduced-Round {AES} with a Known/Secret S-Box}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/772}, year = {2019}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/772} }