Athena: A verifiable, coercion-resistant voting system with linear complexity

Ben Smyth

Paper 2019/761

Athena: A verifiable, coercion-resistant voting system with linear complexity

Ben Smyth

Abstract

Seminal work by Juels, Catalano & Jakobsson delivered a verifiable, coercion-resistant voting system with quadratic complexity. This manuscript attempts to advance the state-of-the-art by delivering a voting system with equivalent security and linear complexity.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Cryptographic protocols
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: election schemes
Contact author(s): research @ bensmyth com
History: 2019-12-17: last of 4 revisions; 2019-07-02: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/761
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/761,
      author = {Ben Smyth},
      title = {Athena: A verifiable, coercion-resistant voting system with linear complexity},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/761},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/761}
}