Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/710

A Comprehensive Formal Security Analysis and Revision of the Two-phase Key Exchange Primitive of TPM 2.0

Qianying Zhang and Shijun Zhao and Zhiping Shi and Yong Guan and Guohui Wang

Abstract: The Trusted Platform Module (TPM) version 2.0, which has been demonstrated as a key element of Industry 4.0, presents a two-phase key exchange primitive for secure communications between Industry 4.0 components. The key exchange primitive of TPM 2.0 can be used to implement three widely-standardized authenticated key exchange protocols: the Full Unified Model, the Full MQV, and the SM2 key exchange protocols. However, vulnerabilities have been found in all of these protocols. Fortunately, it seems that the protections offered by TPM chips can mitigate these vulnerabilities. In this paper, we present a security model which captures TPM's protections on keys and protocols' computation environments and in which multiple protocols can be analyzed in a unified way. Based on the unified security model, we give the first formal security analysis of the key exchange primitive of TPM 2.0, and the analysis results show that, with the help of hardware protections of TPM chips, the key exchange primitive indeed satisfies the well-defined security property of our security model, but unfortunately under some impractical limiting conditions, which would prevent the application of the key exchange primitive in real-world networks. To make TPM 2.0 applicable to real-world networks, we present a revision of the key exchange primitive of TPM 2.0, which can keep secure without the limiting conditions. We give a rigorous analysis of our revision, and the results show that our revision achieves not only the basic security property of modern AKE security models but also some further security properties.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Network security, Cryptographic protocols, Communication networks

Date: received 15 Jun 2019, withdrawn 18 Jun 2019

Contact author: zqyzsj at gmail com

Available format(s): (-- withdrawn --)

Version: 20190618:135424 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/710


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