Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/707

Post-Quantum UC-Secure Oblivious Transfer in the Standard Model with Adaptive Corruptions

Olivier Blazy and CÚline Chevalier and Quoc Huy Vu

Abstract: Since the seminal result of Kilian, Oblivious Transfer has proven to be a fundamental primitive in cryptography. In such a scheme, a user is able to gain access to an element owned by a server, without learning more than this single element, and without the server learning which element the user has accessed. This primitive has received a lot of study in the literature, among which very few schemes are based on lattices. The recent NIST call for post-quantum encryption and signature schemes has revived the interest for cryptographic protocols based on post-quantum assumptions and the need for a secure post-quantum oblivious transfer scheme. In this paper, we show how to construct an oblivious transfer scheme based on lattices, from a collision-resistant chameleon hash scheme (CH) and a CCA encryption scheme accepting a smooth projective hash function (SPHF). Note that our scheme does not rely on random oracles and provides UC security against adaptive corruptions assuming reliable erasures.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Smooth Projective Hash Functions, Oblivious Transfer

Original Publication (with major differences): ARES 2019

Date: received 14 Jun 2019

Contact author: qhvu at ens fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190618:103835 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/707


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