Paper 2019/707

Post-Quantum UC-Secure Oblivious Transfer in the Standard Model with Adaptive Corruptions

Olivier Blazy, Céline Chevalier, and Quoc Huy Vu


Since the seminal result of Kilian, Oblivious Transfer has proven to be a fundamental primitive in cryptography. In such a scheme, a user is able to gain access to an element owned by a server, without learning more than this single element, and without the server learning which element the user has accessed. This primitive has received a lot of study in the literature, among which very few schemes are based on lattices. The recent NIST call for post-quantum encryption and signature schemes has revived the interest for cryptographic protocols based on post-quantum assumptions and the need for a secure post-quantum oblivious transfer scheme. In this paper, we show how to construct an oblivious transfer scheme based on lattices, from a collision-resistant chameleon hash scheme (CH) and a CCA encryption scheme accepting a smooth projective hash function (SPHF). Note that our scheme does not rely on random oracles and provides UC security against adaptive corruptions assuming reliable erasures.

Available format(s)
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MAJOR revision.ARES 2019
Smooth Projective Hash FunctionsOblivious Transfer
Contact author(s)
qhvu @ ens fr
2019-06-18: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Olivier Blazy and Céline Chevalier and Quoc Huy Vu},
      title = {Post-Quantum UC-Secure Oblivious Transfer in the Standard Model with Adaptive Corruptions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/707},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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