Paper 2019/707

Post-Quantum UC-Secure Oblivious Transfer in the Standard Model with Adaptive Corruptions

Olivier Blazy, Céline Chevalier, and Quoc Huy Vu

Abstract

Since the seminal result of Kilian, Oblivious Transfer has proven to be a fundamental primitive in cryptography. In such a scheme, a user is able to gain access to an element owned by a server, without learning more than this single element, and without the server learning which element the user has accessed. This primitive has received a lot of study in the literature, among which very few schemes are based on lattices. The recent NIST call for post-quantum encryption and signature schemes has revived the interest for cryptographic protocols based on post-quantum assumptions and the need for a secure post-quantum oblivious transfer scheme. In this paper, we show how to construct an oblivious transfer scheme based on lattices, from a collision-resistant chameleon hash scheme (CH) and a CCA encryption scheme accepting a smooth projective hash function (SPHF). Note that our scheme does not rely on random oracles and provides UC security against adaptive corruptions assuming reliable erasures.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. MAJOR revision.ARES 2019
Keywords
Smooth Projective Hash FunctionsOblivious Transfer
Contact author(s)
qhvu @ ens fr
History
2019-06-18: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/707
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/707,
      author = {Olivier Blazy and Céline Chevalier and Quoc Huy Vu},
      title = {Post-Quantum UC-Secure Oblivious Transfer in the Standard Model with Adaptive Corruptions},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/707},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/707}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/707}
}
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