Paper 2019/701

Decentralized Multi-authority Anonymous Authentication for Global Identities with Non-interactive Proofs

Hiroaki Anada, University of Nagasaki
Abstract

A decentralized multi-authority anonymous authentication scheme that is suitable for IoT and blockchains is proposed, in which a prover and a verifier are non-interactive. The proposed scheme can treat dynamically increasing/decreasing independent attribute authorities. When an entity wants the authorities to issue attribute credentials, the authorities only have to generate digital signatures on her global identity. Two security definitions are given; resistance against eavesdrop-and-collude attacks that cause misauthentication, and anonymity for privacy protection. Then a construction of our scheme is described under a principle of ``commit-to-ID'' to attain resistance against the collusion attacks. There are two building blocks; the structure-preserving signature scheme and the Groth-Sahai non-interactive proof system, the both of which are in the setting of bilinear groups. The proposed scheme is proved to be secure in the standard model.

Note: The terminology was changed: (1)"bound" --> "bundled"; (2)"bound product of languages" --> "bundled languages". A footnote was added. ``Remark on Replay Attack and Application to Blockchain'' was added.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Proceedings of "IEEE BITS 2019" (co-held with "IEEE SMARTCOMP 2019")
Keywords
decentralized authorities anonymous authentication collusion resistance non-interactive blockchain
Contact author(s)
anada @ sun ac jp
History
2022-07-06: last of 5 revisions
2019-06-13: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/701
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/701,
      author = {Hiroaki Anada},
      title = {Decentralized Multi-authority Anonymous Authentication for Global Identities with Non-interactive Proofs},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/701},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/701}
}
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