Paper 2019/652
The Exchange Attack: How to Distinguish Six Rounds of AES with $2^{88.2}$ chosen plaintexts
Navid Ghaedi Bardeh and Sondre Rønjom
Abstract
In this paper we present exchange-equivalence attacks which is a new cryptanalytic attack technique suitable for SPN-like block cipher designs. Our new technique results in the first secret-key chosen plaintext distinguisher for 6-round AES. The complexity of the distinguisher is about $2^{88.2}$ in terms of data, memory and computational complexity. The distinguishing attack for AES reduced to six rounds is a straight-forward extension of an exchange attack for 5-round AES that requires $2^{30}$ in terms of chosen plaintexts and computation. This is also a new record for AES reduced to five rounds. The main result of this paper is that AES up to at least six rounds is biased when restricted to exchange-invariant sets of plaintexts.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published by the IACR in ASIACRYPT 2019
- Keywords
- SPNAESExchange Equivalence AttacksExchange Invariant SetsExchange Equivalence ClassSecret-Key modelDifferential Cryptanalysis
- Contact author(s)
- Navid bardeh @ uib no
- History
- 2019-09-14: revised
- 2019-06-04: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/652
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/652,
author = {Navid Ghaedi Bardeh and Sondre Rønjom},
title = {The Exchange Attack: How to Distinguish Six Rounds of AES with $2^{88.2}$ chosen plaintexts},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/652},
year = {2019},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/652}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/652}
}
