Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/627

Unconditionally Secure Computation Against Low-Complexity Leakage

Andrej Bogdanov and Yuval Ishai and Akshayaram Srinivasan

Abstract: We consider the problem of constructing leakage-resilient circuit compilers that are secure against global leakage functions with bounded output length. By global, we mean that the leakage can depend on all circuit wires and output a low-complexity function (represented as a multi-output Boolean circuit) applied on these wires. In this work, we design compilers both in the stateless (a.k.a. single-shot leakage) setting and the stateful (a.k.a. continuous leakage) setting that are unconditionally secure against AC0 leakage and similar low-complexity classes. In the stateless case, we show that the original private circuits construction of Ishai, Sahai, and Wagner (Crypto 2003) is actually secure against AC0 leakage. In the stateful case, we modify the construction of Rothblum (Crypto 2012), obtaining a simple construction with unconditional security. Prior works that designed leakage-resilient circuit compilers against AC0 leakage had to rely either on secure hardware components (Faust et al., Eurocrypt 2010, Miles-Viola, STOC 2013) or on (unproven) complexity-theoretic assumptions (Rothblum, Crypto 2012).

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Original Publication (with minor differences): IACR-CRYPTO-2019

Date: received 1 Jun 2019, last revised 1 Jun 2019

Contact author: andrejb at gmail com, yuval ishai@gmail com, akshayaram@berkeley edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190603:072332 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/627


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