Paper 2019/626

Simultaneous Amplification: The Case of Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge

Vipul Goyal, Aayush Jain, and Amit Sahai

Abstract

In this work, we explore the question of simultaneous privacy and soundness amplification for non-interactive zero-knowledge argument systems (NIZK). We show that any sound and zero-knowledge NIZK candidate satisfying , for any constant , can be turned into a computationally sound and zero-knowledge candidate with the only extra assumption of a subexponentially secure public-key encryption. We develop novel techniques to leverage the use of leakage simulation lemma (Jetchev-Peitzrak TCC 2014) to argue amplification. A crucial component of our result is a new notion for secret sharing instances. We believe that this may be of independent interest. To achieve this result we analyze following two transformations: - Parallel Repetition: We show that using parallel repetition any sound and zero-knowledge NIZK candidate can be turned into (roughly) sound and zero-knowledge candidate. Here is the repetition parameter. - MPC based Repetition: We propose a new transformation that amplifies zero-knowledge in the same way that parallel repetition amplifies soundness. We show that using this any sound and zero-knowledge NIZK candidate can be turned into (roughly) sound and zero-knowledge candidate. Then we show that using these transformations in a zig-zag fashion we can obtain our result. Finally, we also present a simple transformation which directly turns any NIZK candidate satisfying to a secure one.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Publication info
Published by the IACR in CRYPTO 2019
Keywords
NIZKSecurity Amplification
Contact author(s)
vipul @ cmu edu
aayushjain @ cs ucla edu
sahai @ cs ucla edu
History
2019-06-03: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/626
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/626,
      author = {Vipul Goyal and Aayush Jain and Amit Sahai},
      title = {Simultaneous Amplification: The Case of Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/626},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/626}
}
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