Paper 2019/606

An Efficient and Provable Masked Implementation of qTESLA

François Gérard and Mélissa Rossi

Abstract

Now that the NIST’s post-quantum cryptography competition has entered in its second phase, the time has come to focus more closely on practical aspects of the candidates. While efficient implementations of the proposed schemes are somewhat included in the submission packages, certain issues like the threat of side-channel attacks are often lightly touched upon by the authors. Hence, the community is encouraged by the NIST to join the war effort to treat those peripheral, but nonetheless crucial, topics. In this paper, we study the lattice-based signature scheme qTESLA in the context of the masking countermeasure. Continuing a line of research opened by Barthe et al. at Eurocrypt 2018 with the masking of the GLP signature scheme, we extend and modify their work to mask qTESLA. Based on the work of Migliore et al. in ACNS 2019, we slightly modify the parameters to improve the masked performance while keeping the same security. The masking can be done at any order and specialized gadgets are used to get maximal efficiency at order 1. We implemented our countermeasure in the original code of the submission and performed tests at different orders to assess the feasibility of our technique.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Major revision. CARDIS 2019
Contact author(s)
fragerar @ ulb ac be
melissa rossi @ ens fr
History
2019-10-11: revised
2019-06-02: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/606
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/606,
      author = {François Gérard and Mélissa Rossi},
      title = {An Efficient and Provable Masked Implementation of {qTESLA}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/606},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/606}
}
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