Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/585

On Misuse of Nonce-Misuse Resistance: Adapting Differential Fault Attacks on (few) CAESAR Winners

Mustafa Khairallah and Shivam Bhasin and Anupam Chattopadhyay

Abstract: In this paper, we study DFA attacks on some of the CAESAR competition winners. We study the challenges imposed by the design of these modes, such as masking of the ciphertext. We also show that a very small number of nonce repetition and faults is required, which makes it very practical. We show that OCB and COLM need 1 nonce repetition and 3 faults only to uniquely identify the Key.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Fault Attacks, DFA, SPNs, AES, Block Ciphers, differential fault analysis, autheticated encryption, AEAD, COLM, Deoxys, OCB

Original Publication (with minor differences): 8th IEEE International Workshop on Advances in Sensors and Interfaces

Date: received 28 May 2019

Contact author: mustafam001 at e ntu edu sg

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190530:203156 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/585


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