On Misuse of Nonce-Misuse Resistance: Adapting Differential Fault Attacks on (few) CAESAR Winners

Mustafa Khairallah; Shivam Bhasin; Anupam Chattopadhyay

Paper 2019/585

On Misuse of Nonce-Misuse Resistance: Adapting Differential Fault Attacks on (few) CAESAR Winners

Mustafa Khairallah, Shivam Bhasin, and Anupam Chattopadhyay

Abstract

In this paper, we study DFA attacks on some of the CAESAR competition winners. We study the challenges imposed by the design of these modes, such as masking of the ciphertext. We also show that a very small number of nonce repetition and faults is required, which makes it very practical. We show that OCB and COLM need 1 nonce repetition and 3 faults only to uniquely identify the Key.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Minor revision. 8th IEEE International Workshop on Advances in Sensors and Interfaces
Keywords: Fault Attacks DFA SPNs AES Block Ciphers differential fault analysis autheticated encryption AEAD COLM Deoxys OCB
Contact author(s): mustafam001 @ e ntu edu sg
History: 2019-05-30: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/585
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/585,
      author = {Mustafa Khairallah and Shivam Bhasin and Anupam Chattopadhyay},
      title = {On Misuse of Nonce-Misuse Resistance: Adapting Differential Fault Attacks on (few) CAESAR Winners},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/585},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/585}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/585}
}