Paper 2019/572

On the Commitment Capacity of Unfair Noisy Channels

Claude Crépeau, Rafael Dowsley, and Anderson C. A. Nascimento

Abstract

Noisy channels are a valuable resource from a cryptographic point of view. They can be used for exchanging secret-keys as well as realizing other cryptographic primitives such as commitment and oblivious transfer. To be really useful, noisy channels have to be consider in the scenario where a cheating party has some degree of control over the channel characteristics. Damgård et al. (EUROCRYPT 1999) proposed a more realistic model where such level of control is permitted to an adversary, the so called unfair noisy channels, and proved that they can be used to obtain commitment and oblivious transfer protocols. Given that noisy channels are a precious resource for cryptographic purposes, one important question is determining the optimal rate in which they can be used. The commitment capacity has already been determined for the cases of discrete memoryless channels and Gaussian channels. In this work we address the problem of determining the commitment capacity of unfair noisy channels. We compute a single-letter characterization of the commitment capacity of unfair noisy channels. In the case where an adversary has no control over the channel (the fair case) our capacity reduces to the well-known capacity of a discrete memoryless binary symmetric channel.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Preprint. Minor revision.
Keywords
Commitment capacityunconditionally secure cryptographyunfair noisy channels.
Contact author(s)
rafael @ dowsley net
History
2019-05-27: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/572
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/572,
      author = {Claude Crépeau and Rafael Dowsley and Anderson C.  A.  Nascimento},
      title = {On the Commitment Capacity of Unfair Noisy Channels},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/572},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/572}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/572}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.