Paper 2019/564
Verification of Authenticated Firmware Load
Sujit Kumar Muduli, Pramod Subramanyan, and Sayak Ray
Abstract
An important primitive in ensuring security of modern systems-on-chip designs are protocols for authenticated firmware load. These loaders read a firmware binary image from an untrusted input device, authenticate the image using cryptography and load the image into memory for execution if authentication succeeds. While these protocols are an essential part of the hardware root of trust in almost all modern computing devices, verification techniques for reasoning about end-to-end security of these protocols do not exist. This paper takes a step toward addressing this gap by introducing a system model, adversary model and end-to-end security property that enable reasoning about the security of authenticated load protocols. We then present a decomposition of the security hyperproperty into two simpler 2-safety properties that enables more scalable verification. Experiments on a protocol model demonstrate viability of the methodology.
Note: v2.2.1 of the paper with revisions based on referee comments.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. MINOR revision.Formal Methods in Computer-Aided Design (FMCAD) 2019
- Keywords
- formal methodsformal verificationmodel checkingsecurebootauthenticated loadsecurity property specification
- Contact author(s)
- spramod @ cse iitk ac in
- History
- 2019-08-20: last of 5 revisions
- 2019-05-27: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/564
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/564,
author = {Sujit Kumar Muduli and Pramod Subramanyan and Sayak Ray},
title = {Verification of Authenticated Firmware Load},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/564},
year = {2019},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/564}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/564}
}
