Paper 2019/558
How to not break SIDH
Chloe Martindale and Lorenz Panny
Abstract
We give a number of approaches which, to a newcomer, may seem like natural ways to attack the SIDH/SIKE protocol, and explain why each of these approaches seems to fail, at least with the specific setup and parameters of SIKE. Our aim is to save some time for others who are looking to assess the security of SIDH/SIKE. We include methods that fail to attack the pure isogeny problem, namely: looking at the $\mathbb F_p$-subgraph, lifting to characteristic zero, and using Weil restrictions. We also include methods that fail to make use of the public 2-power and 3-power torsion points, namely: interpolation techniques, any purely group-theoretic approaches, and constructing an endomorphism à la Petit to exploit the auxiliary points, but with balanced parameters.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Public-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. CFAIL 2019
- Keywords
- isogeniesSIDHcryptanalysisnegative results
- Contact author(s)
-
chloemartindale @ gmail com
l s panny @ tue nl - History
- 2019-05-25: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/558
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/558,
author = {Chloe Martindale and Lorenz Panny},
title = {How to not break {SIDH}},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/558},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/558}
}
