Paper 2019/543
TMPS: Ticket-Mediated Password Strengthening
John Kelsey, Dana Dachman-Soled, Sweta Mishra, and Meltem Sonmez Turan
Abstract
We introduce the notion of Ticket-Mediated Password Strengthening (TMPS), a technique for allowing users to derive keys from passwords while imposing a strict limit on the number of guesses of their password any attacker can make, and strongly protecting the users' privacy. We describe the security requirements of TMPS, and then a set of efficient and practical protocols to implement a TMPS scheme, requiring only hash functions, CCA2-secure encryption, and blind signatures. We provide several variant protocols, including an offline symmetric-only protocol that uses a local trusted computing environment, and online variants that use group signatures or stronger trust assumptions instead of blind signatures. We formalize the security of our scheme by defining an ideal functionality in the Universal Composability (UC) framework, and by providing game-based definitions of security. We prove that our protocol realizes the ideal functionality in the random oracle model (ROM) under adaptive corruptions with erasures, and prove that security with respect to the ideal/real definition implies security with respect to the game-based definitions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- password strengtheningpasswordcryptography
- Contact author(s)
-
john kelsey @ nist gov
danadach @ ece umd edu
meltem turan @ nist gov
sweta mishra @ nist gov - History
- 2019-05-22: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/543
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/543,
author = {John Kelsey and Dana Dachman-Soled and Sweta Mishra and Meltem Sonmez Turan},
title = {{TMPS}: Ticket-Mediated Password Strengthening},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/543},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/543}
}
