Paper 2019/540

A chosen key attack against the secret S-boxes of GOST

Markku-Juhani O. Saarinen

Abstract

I am making this work from August 1998 available for historical reasons. It has been cited as an ``unpublished manuscript'' more than two dozen times over the years -- even though it has not been publicly available anywhere for almost 20 years. The short memo describes a simple non-intrusive reverse engineering technique against Russian GOST chips. The technique is based on a slide attack. This may be historically interesting since slide attacks had not been ``invented yet'', at least in formal sense. The brief original abstract: We show that a simple ``black box'' chosen-key attack against GOST can recover secret S-boxes with approximately $2^{32}$ encryptions.

Note: The August 1998 memo is included in its original form, prefaced by some historical notes.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Secret-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
GOSTMagmaSlide Attack
Contact author(s)
mjos @ iki fi
History
2019-05-22: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/540
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/540,
      author = {Markku-Juhani O.  Saarinen},
      title = {A chosen key attack against the secret S-boxes of {GOST}},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/540},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/540}
}
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