Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/529

UC-Commitment Schemes with Phase-Adaptive Security from Trapdoor Functions

Pedro Branco and Manuel Goul„o and Paulo Mateus

Abstract: We propose a generic framework for perfectly hiding UC-Commitment schemes in the Global Random Oracle model of Canetti \textit{el at.} (CCS 14). The main building block of our construction is a novel primitive called Sampleable-Range Trapdoor Function, that is, a trapdoor function for which there is a non-negligible probability of finding preimages when given a uniformly chosen element of its codomain and the corresponding trapdoor. To show the versatility of the framework, we give concrete instantiations based on factoring, code-based, and lattice-based hardness assumptions. Our construction yields the first lattice-based UC-Commitment scheme (not constructed via generic transformations, such as via Oblivious Transfer), and achieves what we call \textit{phase-adaptive security}, a novel security notion we introduce which is stronger than static security.

Achieving adaptive security for UC-Commitment schemes is non-trivial and, usually, comes at the price of efficiency. Phase-adaptive security stands between adaptive and static security, and may be of independent interest. In this model, adversaries can corrupt at the beginning or between the commitment and opening phases of the protocol, but not during their execution. This new model is motivated by the fact that, in practice, it is more likely that parties are corrupted between phases of the protocol (where a relatively long period may elapse) than during their execution.

Category / Keywords: foundations / Commitment, Universal Composability, Global Random Oracle

Date: received 20 May 2019

Contact author: pmbranco at math tecnico ulisboa pt,mgoulao@math tecnico ulisboa pt,pmat@math tecnico ulisboa pt

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190520:203846 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/529


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