## Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/522

Secret-Sharing from Robust Conditional Disclosure of Secrets

Amos Beimel and Naty Peter

Abstract: A secret-sharing scheme is a method by which a dealer, holding a secret string, distributes shares to parties such that only authorized subsets of parties can reconstruct the secret. The collection of authorized subsets is called an access structure. Secret-sharing schemes are an important tool in cryptography and they are used as a building box in many secure protocols. In the original constructions of secret-sharing schemes by Ito et al. [Globecom 1987], the share size of each party is $\tilde{O}(2^{n})$ (where $n$ is the number of parties in the access structure). New constructions of secret-sharing schemes followed; however, the share size in these schemes remains basically the same. Although much efforts have been devoted to this problem, no progress was made for more than 30 years. Recently, in a breakthrough paper, Liu and Vaikuntanathan [STOC 2018] constructed a secret-sharing scheme for a general access structure with share size $\tilde{O}(2^{0.994n})$. The construction is based on new protocols for conditional disclosure of secrets (CDS). This was improved by Applebaum et al. [EUROCRYPT 2019] to $\tilde{O}(2^{0.892n})$.

In this work, we construct improved secret-sharing schemes for a general access structure with share size $\tilde{O}(2^{0.762n})$. Our schemes are linear, that is, the shares are a linear function of the secret and some random elements from a finite field. Previously, the best linear secret-sharing scheme had shares of size $\tilde{O}(2^{0.942n})$. Most applications of secret-sharing require linearity. Our scheme is conceptually simpler than previous schemes, using a new reduction to two-party CDS protocols (previous schemes used a reduction to multi-party CDS protocols).

In a CDS protocol for a function $f$, there are $k$ parties and a referee; each party holds a private input and a common secret, and sends one message to the referee (without seeing the other messages). On one hand, if the function $f$ applied to the inputs returns $1$, then it is required that the referee, which knows the inputs, can reconstruct the secret from the messages. On the other hand, if the function $f$ applied to the inputs returns $0$, then the referee should get no information on the secret from the messages. However, if the referee gets two messages from a party, corresponding to two different inputs (as happens in our reduction from secret-sharing to CDS), then the referee might be able to reconstruct the secret although it should not.

To overcome this problem, we define and construct $t$-robust CDS protocols, where the referee cannot get any information on the secret when it gets $t$ messages for a set of zero-inputs of $f$. We show that if a function $f$ has a two-party CDS protocol with message size $c_f$, then it has a two-party $t$-robust CDS protocol with normalized message size $\tilde{O}(t c_f)$. Furthermore, we show that every function $f:[N] \times [N]\rightarrow \{0,1\}$ has a multi-linear $t$-robust CDS protocol with normalized message size $\tilde{O}(t+\sqrt{N})$. We use a variant of this protocol (with $t$ slightly larger than $\sqrt{N}$) to construct our improved linear secret-sharing schemes. Finally, we construct robust $k$-party CDS protocols for $k>2$.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / secret sharing