Paper 2019/515

A Countermeasure Against Statistical Ineffective Fault Analysis

Jakub Breier
Mustafa Khairallah
Xiaolu Hou
Yang Liu
Abstract

When considering practical attacks against cryptographic implementations, Fault Injection Attacks (FIA) pose a powerful tool that can recover the secret key within few encryptions. Over the past few decades they have become a well-studied topic both by academic an industry practitioners. Current state-of-the-art countermeasures against Fault Injection Attacks (FIA) provide good protection against analysis methods that require the differences in the correct and faulty ciphertext to derive the secret information, such as Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) or collision fault analysis. However, recent progress in Ineffective Fault Analysis (IFA) and Statistical IFA (SIFA) constitutes a real threat against cryptographic implementations. Such methods cannot be thwarted by standard FIA countermeasures that focus on detecting the change in the intermediate data. In this paper, we present a novel method based on error correcting codes that protects implementations against SIFA. We design a set of universal error-correcting gates that can be used for block cipher implementations. We analyze a hardware implementation of protected GIFT-64 and show that our method provides 100% protection against SIFA.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Implementation
Publication info
Published elsewhere. IEEE TCAS2
DOI
10.1109/TCSII.2020.2989184
Keywords
fault injection attacks ineffective fault analysis countermeasures error-correcting codes SIFA
Contact author(s)
jbreier @ jbreier com
History
2022-09-13: last of 4 revisions
2019-05-20: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/515
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/515,
      author = {Jakub Breier and Mustafa Khairallah and Xiaolu Hou and Yang Liu},
      title = {A Countermeasure Against Statistical Ineffective Fault Analysis},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/515},
      year = {2019},
      doi = {10.1109/TCSII.2020.2989184},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/515}
}
Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.