Paper 2019/482

Tiny WireGuard Tweak

Jacob Appelbaum, Chloe Martindale, and Peter Wu

Abstract

We show that a future adversary with access to a quantum computer, historic network traffic protected by WireGuard, and knowledge of a WireGuard user's long-term static public key can likely decrypt many of the WireGuard user's historic messages. We propose a simple, efficient alteration to the WireGuard protocol that mitigates this vulnerability, with negligible additional computational and memory costs. Our changes add zero additional bytes of data to the wire format of the WireGuard protocol. Our alteration provides transitional post-quantum security for any WireGuard user who does not publish their long-term static public key -- it should be exchanged out-of-band.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision.AFRICACRYPT 2019
Keywords
WireGuardpost-quantum cryptographymass surveillancenetwork protocolprivacyVPNsecurity
Contact author(s)
j appelbaum @ tue nl
jacob @ appelbaum net
chloemartindale @ gmail com
peter @ lekensteyn nl
History
2019-05-13: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/482
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/482,
      author = {Jacob Appelbaum and Chloe Martindale and Peter Wu},
      title = {Tiny WireGuard Tweak},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/482},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/482}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/482}
}
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