Defeating the Hart et al, Beullens-Blackburn, Kotov-Menshov-Ushakov, and Merz-Petit Attacks on WalnutDSA(TM)

Iris Anshel; Derek Atkins; Dorian Goldfeld; Paul E Gunnells

Paper 2019/472

Defeating the Hart et al, Beullens-Blackburn, Kotov-Menshov-Ushakov, and Merz-Petit Attacks on WalnutDSA(TM)

Iris Anshel, Derek Atkins, Dorian Goldfeld, and Paul E Gunnells

Abstract

The Walnut Digital Signature Algorithm (WalnutDSA) brings together methods in group theory, representation theory, and number theory, to yield a public-key method that provides a means for messages to be signed and signatures to be verified, on platforms where traditional approaches cannot be executed. After briefly reviewing the various heuristic/practical attacks that have be posited by Hart et al, Beullens-Blackburn, Kotov-Menshov-Ushakov, and Merz-Petit, we detail the parameter choices that defeat each attack, ensure the security of the of the method, and demonstrate its continued utility.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Public-key cryptography
Publication info: Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords: WalnutDSA Group-Theoretic Cryptography Digital Signatures Braids
Contact author(s): datkins @ securerf com
ianshel @ securerf com
dgoldfeld @ securerf com
History: 2019-05-24: revised; 2019-05-10: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/472
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/472,
      author = {Iris Anshel and Derek Atkins and Dorian Goldfeld and Paul E Gunnells},
      title = {Defeating the Hart et al, Beullens-Blackburn, Kotov-Menshov-Ushakov, and Merz-Petit Attacks on {WalnutDSA}({TM})},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/472},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/472}
}