Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/472

Defeating the Hart et al, Beullens-Blackburn, Kotov-Menshov-Ushakov, and Merz-Petit Attacks on WalnutDSA(TM)

Iris Anshel and Derek Atkins and Dorian Goldfeld and Paul E Gunnells

Abstract: The Walnut Digital Signature Algorithm (WalnutDSA) brings together methods in group theory, representation theory, and number theory, to yield a public-key method that provides a means for messages to be signed and signatures to be verified, on platforms where traditional approaches cannot be executed. After briefly reviewing the various heuristic/practical attacks that have be posited by Hart et al, Beullens-Blackburn, Kotov-Menshov-Ushakov, and Merz-Petit, we detail the parameter choices that defeat each attack, ensure the security of the of the method, and demonstrate its continued utility.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / WalnutDSA, Group-Theoretic Cryptography, Digital Signatures, Braids

Date: received 8 May 2019, last revised 24 May 2019

Contact author: datkins at securerf com, ianshel@securerf com, dgoldfeld@securerf com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190524:154835 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/472


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