Paper 2019/472

Defeating the Hart et al, Beullens-Blackburn, Kotov-Menshov-Ushakov, and Merz-Petit Attacks on WalnutDSA(TM)

Iris Anshel, Derek Atkins, Dorian Goldfeld, and Paul E Gunnells

Abstract

The Walnut Digital Signature Algorithm (WalnutDSA) brings together methods in group theory, representation theory, and number theory, to yield a public-key method that provides a means for messages to be signed and signatures to be verified, on platforms where traditional approaches cannot be executed. After briefly reviewing the various heuristic/practical attacks that have be posited by Hart et al, Beullens-Blackburn, Kotov-Menshov-Ushakov, and Merz-Petit, we detail the parameter choices that defeat each attack, ensure the security of the of the method, and demonstrate its continued utility.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
WalnutDSAGroup-Theoretic CryptographyDigital SignaturesBraids
Contact author(s)
datkins @ securerf com
ianshel @ securerf com
dgoldfeld @ securerf com
History
2019-05-24: revised
2019-05-10: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/472
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/472,
      author = {Iris Anshel and Derek Atkins and Dorian Goldfeld and Paul E Gunnells},
      title = {Defeating the Hart et al, Beullens-Blackburn, Kotov-Menshov-Ushakov, and Merz-Petit Attacks on WalnutDSA(TM)},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/472},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/472}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/472}
}
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