Revisiting Location Privacy  from a Side-Channel Analysis Viewpoint (Extended Version)

Clément Massart; François-Xavier Standaert

Paper 2019/467

Revisiting Location Privacy from a Side-Channel Analysis Viewpoint (Extended Version)

Clément Massart and François-Xavier Standaert

Abstract

Inspired by the literature on side-channel attacks against cryptographic implementations, we describe a framework for the analysis of location privacy. It allows us to revisit (continuous) re-identification attacks with a combination of information theoretic and security metrics. Our results highlight conceptual differences between re-identification attacks exploiting leakages that are internal or external to a pseudonymised database. They put forward the amount of data to collect in order to estimate a predictive model as an important -- yet less discussed -- dimension of privacy assessments. They finally leverage recent results on the security evaluations/certification of cryptographic implementations to connect information theoretic and security metrics, and to formally bound the risk of re-identification with external leakages.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Applications
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Major revision. Proceedings of Africacrypt 2019
Keywords: side-channel analysis location privacy
Contact author(s): clement massart @ uclouvain be
History: 2019-05-10: received
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/467
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/467,
      author = {Clément Massart and François-Xavier Standaert},
      title = {Revisiting Location Privacy  from a Side-Channel Analysis Viewpoint (Extended Version)},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/467},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/467}
}