Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/467

Revisiting Location Privacy from a Side-Channel Analysis Viewpoint (Extended Version)

Clément Massart and François-Xavier Standaert

Abstract: Inspired by the literature on side-channel attacks against cryptographic implementations, we describe a framework for the analysis of location privacy. It allows us to revisit (continuous) re-identification attacks with a combination of information theoretic and security metrics. Our results highlight conceptual differences between re-identification attacks exploiting leakages that are internal or external to a pseudonymised database. They put forward the amount of data to collect in order to estimate a predictive model as an important -- yet less discussed -- dimension of privacy assessments. They finally leverage recent results on the security evaluations/certification of cryptographic implementations to connect information theoretic and security metrics, and to formally bound the risk of re-identification with external leakages.

Category / Keywords: applications / side-channel analysis, location privacy

Original Publication (with major differences): Proceedings of Africacrypt 2019

Date: received 7 May 2019

Contact author: clement massart at uclouvain be

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190510:123304 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/467


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