### Fast Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials on Standard Smart Cards

Jan Camenisch, Manu Drijvers, Petr Dzurenda, and Jan Hajny

##### Abstract

Cryptographic anonymous credential schemes allow users to prove their personal attributes, such as age, nationality, or the validity of a ticket or a pre-paid pass, while preserving their privacy, as such proofs are unlinkable and attributes can be selectively disclosed. Recently, Chase et al. (CCS 2014) observe that in such systems, a typical setup is that the credential issuer also serves as the verifier. They introduce keyed-verification credentials that are tailored to this setting. In this paper, we present a novel keyed-verification credential system designed for lightweight devices (primarily smart cards) and prove its security. By using a novel algebraic MAC based on Boneh-Boyen signatures, we achieve the most efficient proving protocol compared to existing schemes. To demonstrate the practicality of our scheme in real applications, including large-scale services such as public transportation or e-government, we present an implementation on a standard, off-the-shelf, Multos smart card. While using significantly higher security parameters than most existing implementations, we achieve performance that is more than 44 % better than the current state-of-the-art implementation.

Note: The final publication is available at Springer LNCS.

Available format(s)
Category
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
Published elsewhere. Minor revision.IFIP ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection - IFIP SEC 2019
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-22312-0
Keywords
Privacyanonymous credentialsauthenticationsmart cards
Contact author(s)
hajny @ feec vutbr cz
History
2019-05-31: revised
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/460

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/460,
author = {Jan Camenisch and Manu Drijvers and Petr Dzurenda and Jan Hajny},
title = {Fast Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials on Standard Smart Cards},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/460},
year = {2019},
doi = {10.1007/978-3-030-22312-0},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/460}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/460}
}

Note: In order to protect the privacy of readers, eprint.iacr.org does not use cookies or embedded third party content.