Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/460

Fast Keyed-Verification Anonymous Credentials on Standard Smart Cards

Jan Camenisch and Manu Drijvers and Petr Dzurenda and Jan Hajny

Abstract: Cryptographic anonymous credential schemes allow users to prove their personal attributes, such as age, nationality, or the validity of a ticket or a pre-paid pass, while preserving their privacy, as such proofs are unlinkable and attributes can be selectively disclosed. Recently, Chase et al. (CCS 2014) observe that in such systems, a typical setup is that the credential issuer also serves as the verifier. They introduce keyed-verification credentials that are tailored to this setting. In this paper, we present a novel keyed-verification credential system designed for lightweight devices (primarily smart cards) and prove its security. By using a novel algebraic MAC based on Boneh-Boyen signatures, we achieve the most efficient proving protocol compared to existing schemes. To demonstrate the practicality of our scheme in real applications, including large-scale services such as public transportation or e-government, we present an implementation on a standard, off-the-shelf, Multos smart card. While using significantly higher security parameters than most existing implementations, we achieve performance that is more than 44 % better than the current state-of-the-art implementation.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Privacy, anonymous credentials, authentication, smart cards

Original Publication (with minor differences): IFIP ICT Systems Security and Privacy Protection - IFIP SEC 2019
DOI:
10.1007/978-3-030-22312-0

Date: received 6 May 2019, last revised 31 May 2019

Contact author: hajny at feec vutbr cz

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: The final publication is available at Springer LNCS.

Version: 20190531:104042 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/460


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