Paper 2019/444
Symmetric-key Authenticated Key Exchange (SAKE) with Perfect Forward Secrecy
Gildas Avoine, Sébastien Canard, and Loïc Ferreira
Abstract
Key exchange protocols in the asymmetric-key setting are known to provide stronger security properties than protocols in symmetric-key cryptography. In particular, they can provide perfect forward secrecy, as illustrated by key exchange protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme. However public-key algorithms are too heavy for low-resource devices, which can then not benefit from forward secrecy. In this paper, we describe a scheme that solves this issue. Using a nifty resynchronisation technique, we propose an authenticated key exchange protocol in the symmetric-key setting that guarantees perfect forward secrecy. We prove that the protocol is sound, and provide a formal security proof.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Authenticated key agreementSymmetric-key cryptographyPerfect forward secrecyKey-evolving
- Contact author(s)
- loic ferreira @ orange com
- History
- 2019-06-26: revised
- 2019-05-08: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/444
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/444,
author = {Gildas Avoine and Sébastien Canard and Loïc Ferreira},
title = {Symmetric-key Authenticated Key Exchange ({SAKE}) with Perfect Forward Secrecy},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/444},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/444}
}
