Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/444

Symmetric-key Authenticated Key Exchange (SAKE) with Perfect Forward Secrecy

Gildas Avoine and Sébastien Canard and Loïc Ferreira

Abstract: Key exchange protocols in the asymmetric-key setting are known to provide stronger security properties than protocols in symmetric-key cryptography. In particular, they can provide perfect forward secrecy, as illustrated by key exchange protocols based on the Diffie-Hellman scheme. However public-key algorithms are too heavy for low-resource devices, which can then not benefit from forward secrecy. In this paper, we describe a scheme that solves this issue. Using a nifty resynchronisation technique, we propose an authenticated key exchange protocol in the symmetric-key setting that guarantees perfect forward secrecy. We prove that the protocol is sound, and provide a formal security proof.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / Authenticated key agreement, Symmetric-key cryptography, Perfect forward secrecy, Key-evolving

Date: received 1 May 2019, last revised 26 Jun 2019

Contact author: loic ferreira at orange com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190626:090932 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/444


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