Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/443

Contingent payments on a public ledger: models and reductions for automated verification

Sergiu Bursuc and Steve Kremer

Abstract: We study protocols that rely on a public ledger infrastructure, concentrating on protocols for zero-knowledge contingent payment, whose security properties combine diverse notions of fairness and privacy. We argue that rigorous models are required for capturing the ledger semantics, the protocol-ledger interaction, the cryptographic primitives and, ultimately, the security properties one would like to achieve.

Our focus is on a particular level of abstraction, where network messages are represented by a term algebra, protocol execution by state transition systems (e.g. multiset rewrite rules) and where the properties of interest can be analyzed with automated verification tools. We propose models for: (1) the rules guiding the ledger execution, taking the coin functionality of public ledgers such as Bitcoin as an example; (2) the security properties expected from ledger-based zero-knowledge contingent payment protocols; (3) two different security protocols that aim at achieving these properties relying on different ledger infrastructures; (4) reductions that allow simpler term algebras for homomorphic cryptographic schemes.

Altogether, these models allow us to derive a first automated verification for ledger-based zero-knowledge contingent payment using the Tamarin prover. Furthermore, our models help in clarifying certain underlying assumptions, security and efficiency tradeoffs that should be taken into account when deploying protocols on the blockchain.

Category / Keywords: foundations / fair exchange, security models, blockchain, automated security proofs, electronic commerce and payment

Date: received 1 May 2019

Contact author: sergiu bursuc at inria fr,steve kremer@inria fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190508:185841 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/443


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