Paper 2019/438
Oblivious PRF on Committed Vector Inputs and Application to Deduplication of Encrypted Data
Jan Camenisch, Angelo De Caro, Esha Ghosh, and Alessandro Sorniotti
Abstract
Ensuring secure deduplication of encrypted data is a very active
topic of research because deduplication is effective at reducing storage
costs. Schemes supporting deduplication of encrypted data that are
not vulnerable to content guessing attacks (such as Message Locked Encryption)
have been proposed recently [Bellare et al. 2013, Li et al. 2015].
However in all these schemes, there is a key derivation phase that solely
depends on a short hash of the data and not the data itself. Therefore,
a file specofic key can be obtained by anyone possessing the hash. Since
hash values are usually not meant to be secret, a desired solution will be
a more robust oblivious key generation protocol where file hashes need
not be kept private. Motivated by this use-case, we propose a new primitive
for oblivious pseudorandom function (OPRF) on committed vector
inputs in the universal composable (UC) framework. We formalize
this functionality as
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- public-key cryptographyapplicationspseudo-random functions
- Contact author(s)
-
esha ghosh @ microsoft com
jan @ dfinity org
aso @ zurich ibm com
ADC @ zurich ibm com - History
- 2019-05-03: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/438
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/438, author = {Jan Camenisch and Angelo De Caro and Esha Ghosh and Alessandro Sorniotti}, title = {Oblivious {PRF} on Committed Vector Inputs and Application to Deduplication of Encrypted Data}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/438}, year = {2019}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/438} }