Post-Quantum Provably-Secure Authentication and MAC from Mersenne Primes

Houda Ferradi; Keita Xagawa

Paper 2019/409

Post-Quantum Provably-Secure Authentication and MAC from Mersenne Primes

Houda Ferradi and Keita Xagawa

Abstract

This paper presents a novel, yet efficient secret-key authentication and MAC, which provide post-quantum security promise, whose security is reduced to the quantum-safe conjectured hardness of Mersenne Low Hamming Combination (MERS) assumption recently introduced by Aggarwal, Joux, Prakash, and Santha (CRYPTO 2018). Our protocols are very suitable to weak devices like smart card and RFID tags.

Metadata

Available format(s): PDF
Category: Secret-key cryptography
Publication info: Published elsewhere. Major revision. CT-RSA 2020
Keywords: secret-key authentication MAC MERS assumption man-in-the-middle security
Contact author(s): houda ferradi @ ens fr
keita xagawa zv @ hco ntt co jp
History: 2020-01-09: last of 9 revisions; 2019-04-22: received; See all versions
Short URL: https://ia.cr/2019/409
License: CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/409,
      author = {Houda Ferradi and Keita Xagawa},
      title = {Post-Quantum Provably-Secure Authentication and {MAC} from Mersenne Primes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/409},
      year = {2019},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/409}
}