Paper 2019/408
Forgery Attack on SNEIKEN
Mustafa Khairallah
Abstract
This document includes a collision/forgery attack against SNEIKEN128/192/256, where every message with more than 128 bytes of associated data can be converted into another message with different associated data and the same ciphertext/tag. The attack is a direct application of the probability 1 differential of the SNEIK permutation found by Léo Perrin in [Per19]. We verify the attack using the reference implementation of SNEIKEN128 provided by the designers, providing an example of such collisions.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Secret-key cryptography
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- SNEIKforgery attackdifferential cryptanalysiscollisionAEAD
- Contact author(s)
- mustafam001 @ e ntu edu sg
- History
- 2019-04-22: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/408
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/408,
author = {Mustafa Khairallah},
title = {Forgery Attack on SNEIKEN},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/408},
year = {2019},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/408}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/408}
}
