Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/408

Forgery Attack on SNEIKEN

Mustafa Khairallah

Abstract: This document includes a collision/forgery attack against SNEIKEN128/192/256, where every message with more than 128 bytes of associated data can be converted into another message with different associated data and the same ciphertext/tag. The attack is a direct application of the probability 1 differential of the SNEIK permutation found by Léo Perrin in [Per19]. We verify the attack using the reference implementation of SNEIKEN128 provided by the designers, providing an example of such collisions.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / SNEIK, forgery attack, differential cryptanalysis, collision, AEAD

Date: received 18 Apr 2019

Contact author: mustafam001 at e ntu edu sg

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190422:184830 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/408


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