Paper 2019/395
Full Database Reconstruction with Access and Search Pattern Leakage
Evangelia Anna Markatou and Roberto Tamassia
Abstract
The widespread use of cloud computing has enabled several database
providers to store their data on servers in the cloud and answer
queries from those servers. In order to protect the confidentiality
of data in the cloud, a database can be stored in
encrypted form and all queries can be executed on the
encrypted database. Recent research results suggest that a curious cloud provider may be able to decrypt some of the items in the database after seeing a large number of queries and their (encrypted) results.
In this paper, we focus on one-dimensional databases that support range queries and develop an attack that can achieve full database reconstruction, inferring the exact value of every element in the database.
We consider an encrypted database whose records have values from a given universe of
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Applications
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- Searchable EncryptionEncrypted DatabasesLeakage-Abuse AttacksData Recovery
- Contact author(s)
- markatou @ brown edu
- History
- 2019-09-18: revised
- 2019-04-18: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/395
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/395, author = {Evangelia Anna Markatou and Roberto Tamassia}, title = {Full Database Reconstruction with Access and Search Pattern Leakage}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/395}, year = {2019}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/395} }