Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/387

SoK : On DFA Vulnerabilities of Substitution-Permutation Networks

Mustafa Khairallah and Xiaolu Hou and Zakaria Najm and Jakub Breier and Shivam Bhasin and Thomas Peyrin

Abstract: Recently, the NIST launched a competition for lightweight cryptography and a large number of ciphers are expected to be studied and analyzed under this competition. Apart from the classical security, the candidates are desired to be analyzed against physical attacks. Differential Fault Analysis (DFA) is an invasive physical attack method for recovering key information from cipher implementations. Up to date, almost all the block ciphers have been shown to be vulnerable against DFA, while following similar attack patterns. However, so far researchers mostly focused on particular ciphers rather than cipher families, resulting in works that reuse the same idea for different ciphers.

In this article, we aim at bridging this gap, by providing a generic DFA attack method targeting Substitution-Permutation Network (SPN) based families of symmetric block ciphers. We provide an overview of the state-of-the-art of the fault attacks on SPNs, followed by generalized conditions that hold on all the ciphers of this design family. We show that for any SPN, as long as the fault mask injected before a non-linear layer in the last round follows a non-uniform distribution, the key search space can always be reduced. This shows that it is not possible to design an SPN-based cipher that is completely secure against DFA, without randomization. Furthermore, we propose a novel approach to find good fault masks that can leak the key with a small number of instances. We then developed a tool, called Joint Difference Distribution Table (JDDT) for pre-computing the solutions for the fault equations, which allows us to recover the last round key with a very small number of pairs of faulty and non-faulty ciphertexts. We evaluate our methodology on various block ciphers, including PRESENT-80, PRESENT-128, GIFT-64, GIFT-128, AES-128, LED-64, LED-128, Skinny-64-64, Skinny-128-128, PRIDE and PRINCE. The developed technique would allow automated DFA analysis of several candidates in the NIST competition.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Fault Attacks, DFA, SPNs, AES, Block Ciphers, differential fault analysis, substitution-permutation network

Original Publication (with minor differences): AsiaCCS 2019

Date: received 11 Apr 2019

Contact author: mustafam001 at e ntu edu sg

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190416:033041 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/387


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]