Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/374

Probability 1 Iterated Differential in the SNEIK Permutation

Léo Perrin

Abstract: SNEIK is a permutation at the core of a submission to the NIST lightweight cryptography project. In this note, we exhibit an iterated probability 1 differential in this permutation. However, it is still unclear if this differential can be used to construct attacks against the permutation in a mode, e.g., against the hash function SNEIKHA.

We also suggest a simple fix: adding a 32-bit rotation in one tap prevents this issue.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / SNEIK, NIST lightweight cryptography project, Differential Cryptanalysis, ARX, permutation

Date: received 8 Apr 2019

Contact author: leo perrin at inria fr

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190414:031847 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/374


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