Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/357

Lattice-based proof of a shuffle

Núria Costa and Ramiro Martínez and Paz Morillo

Abstract: In this paper we present the first fully post-quantum proof of a shuffle for RLWE encryption schemes. Shuffles are commonly used to construct mixing networks (mix-nets), a key element to ensure anonymity in many applications such as electronic voting systems. They should preserve anonymity even against an attack using quantum computers in order to guarantee long-term privacy. The proof presented in this paper is built over RLWE commitments which are perfectly binding and computationally hiding under the RLWE assumption, thus achieving security in a post-quantum scenario. Furthermore we provide a new definition for a secure mixing node (mix-node) and prove that our construction satisfies this definition.

Category / Keywords: cryptographic protocols / mix-nets, e-voting, post-quantum, RLWE encryption, RLWE commitment, proof of a shuffle

Original Publication (with major differences): 4th Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting (VOTING'19)

Date: received 3 Apr 2019

Contact author: ramiro martinez at upc edu

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190410:001454 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/357


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