Paper 2019/357
Lattice-based proof of a shuffle
Núria Costa, Ramiro Martínez, and Paz Morillo
Abstract
In this paper we present the first fully post-quantum proof of a shuffle for RLWE encryption schemes. Shuffles are commonly used to construct mixing networks (mix-nets), a key element to ensure anonymity in many applications such as electronic voting systems. They should preserve anonymity even against an attack using quantum computers in order to guarantee long-term privacy. The proof presented in this paper is built over RLWE commitments which are perfectly binding and computationally hiding under the RLWE assumption, thus achieving security in a post-quantum scenario. Furthermore we provide a new definition for a secure mixing node (mix-node) and prove that our construction satisfies this definition.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
-
PDF
- Category
- Cryptographic protocols
- Publication info
- Published elsewhere. Major revision. 4th Workshop on Advances in Secure Electronic Voting (VOTING'19)
- Keywords
- mix-netse-votingpost-quantumRLWE encryptionRLWE commitmentproof of a shuffle
- Contact author(s)
- ramiro martinez @ upc edu
- History
- 2020-10-21: last of 2 revisions
- 2019-04-10: received
- See all versions
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/357
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/357,
author = {Núria Costa and Ramiro Martínez and Paz Morillo},
title = {Lattice-based proof of a shuffle},
howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/357},
year = {2019},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/357}
}
