Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/355

To Infect Or Not To Infect: A Critical Analysis Of Infective Countermeasures In Fault Attacks

Anubhab Baksi and Dhiman Saha and Sumanta Sarkar

Abstract: As fault based cryptanalysis is becoming more and more of a practical threat, it is imperative to make efforts to devise suitable countermeasures. In this regard, the so-called ``infective countermeasures'' have garnered particular attention from the community due to their ability in inhibiting differential fault attacks without explicitly detecting the fault. We observe that despite being adopted over a decade ago, a systematic study of infective countermeasures is missing from the literature. Moreover, there seems to be a lack of proper security analysis of the schemes proposed, as quite a few of them have been broken promptly. Our first contribution comes in the form of a generalization of infective schemes which aids us with a better insight into the vulnerabilities, scopes for cost reduction and possible improvements. This way, we are able to propose lightweight alternatives of two existing schemes, propose new design based on already established standards, analyze a security claim made by a scheme proposed in CHES'14 and re-instantiate another scheme which is deemed broken by proposing a simple patch.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / fault countermeasure, infection, differential fault analysis

Date: received 3 Apr 2019, last revised 22 Jun 2019

Contact author: ANUBHAB001 at E NTU EDU SG

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190622:150536 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/355


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