Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/340

Ease of Side-Channel Attacks on AES-192/256 by Targeting Extreme Keys

Antoine Wurcker

Abstract: Concerning the side-channel attacks on Advanced Encryp- tion Standard, it seems that majority of studies focus on the lowest size: AES-128. Even when adaptable to higher sizes (AES-192 and AES-256), lots of state-of-the-art attacks see their complexity substantially raised. Indeed, it often requires to perform two consecutive dependent attacks. The first is similar to the one applied on AES-128, but a part of the key remains unknown and must be retrieved through a second attack directly dependent on the success of the first. This configuration may substantially raise the complexity for the at- tacker, especially if new signal acquisitions with specific input, built using the first key part recovered, must be performed. Any error/uncertainty in the first attack raise the key recovery complexity. Our contribution is to show that this complexity can be lowered to two independent attacks by the mean of attacking separately first and last round keys. We show that the information is enough to recover the main key (or a very small list of candidates) in a negligible exploratory effort.

Category / Keywords: secret-key cryptography / Advanced Encryption Standard, AES, AES-192, AES-256, key recovery, Side-Channel Analysis, SCA

Date: received 30 Mar 2019

Contact author: wurcker01 at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Version: 20190403:020245 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/340