Paper 2019/303

Analysis of TPL Signature Scheme

Terry Shue Chien Lau, Chik How Tan, and Theo Fanuela Prabowo

Abstract

Tan et al. proposed a rank metric code-based signature (TPL) in the 2018 International Symposium on Information Theory and Its Application [3]. Their proposal has compact key size ($8.29$KB, $1.97$KB and $2.90$KB for public key, private key and signature respectively) compared to other code-based signature submitted to the NIST call for Post-Quantum Cryptography Standardization at $128$-bit post-quantum security level. This short paper aims to discuss the practical security of the TPL signature. In particular, we describes how to recover the private key in TPL with practical simulations. Our experimental results show that we are able to recover the private key of TPL in less than $23$ milliseconds for all the proposed schemes at $82$-bit, $98$-bit and $129$-bit post-quantum security level.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
Preprint. Minor revision.
Keywords
Post-quantum SignaturesCryptanalysisKey Recovery AttackPublic-key Encryption
Contact author(s)
tsltlsc @ nus edu sg
History
2019-03-20: received
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/303
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/303,
      author = {Terry Shue Chien Lau and Chik How Tan and Theo Fanuela Prabowo},
      title = {Analysis of TPL Signature Scheme},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/303},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/303}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/303}
}
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