## Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/292

Timing attacks on Error Correcting Codes in Post-Quantum Schemes

Jan-Pieter D'Anvers and Marcel Tiepelt and Frederik Vercauteren and Ingrid Verbauwhede

Abstract: While error correcting codes (ECC) have the potential to significantly reduce the failure probability of post-quantum schemes, they add an extra ECC decoding step to the algorithm. Even though this additional step does not compute directly on the secret key, it is susceptible to side-channel attacks. We show that if no precaution is taken, it is possible to use timing information to distinguish between ciphertexts that result in an error before decoding and ciphertexts that do not contain errors, due to the variable execution time of the ECC decoding algorithm. We demonstrate that this information can be used to break the IND-CCA security of post-quantum secure schemes by presenting an attack on two round 1 candidates to the NIST Post-Quantum Standardization Process: the Ring-LWE scheme LAC and the Mersenne prime scheme Ramstake. This attack recovers the full secret key using a limited number of timed decryption queries and is implemented on the reference and the optimized implementations of both submissions. It is able to retrieve LAC's secret key for all security levels in under 2 minutes using less than $2^{16}$ decryption queries and Ramstake's secret key in under 2 minutes using approximately $2400$ decryption queries. The attack generalizes to other lattice-based schemes with ECC in which any side-channel information about the presence of errors is leaked during decoding.

Category / Keywords: public-key cryptography / Post-Quantum Cryptography, Decryption Failures, Side-Channel Attacks

Original Publication (in the same form): Theory of Implementation Security (TIS) 2019

Date: received 13 Mar 2019, last revised 3 Sep 2019

Contact author: janpieter danvers at esat kuleuven be

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/292

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