Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/275

MPCircuits: Optimized Circuit Generation for Secure Multi-Party Computation

M. Sadegh Riazi and Mojan Javaheripi and Siam U. Hussain and Farinaz Koushanfar

Abstract: Secure Multi-party Computation (MPC) is one of the most influential achievements of modern cryptography: it allows evaluation of an arbitrary function on private inputs from multiple parties without revealing the inputs. A crucial step of utilizing contemporary MPC protocols is to describe the function as a Boolean circuit. While efficient solutions have been proposed for special case of two-party secure computation, the general case of more than two-party is not addressed. This paper proposes MPCircuits, the first automated solution to devise the optimized Boolean circuit representation for any MPC function using hardware synthesis tools with new customized libraries that are scalable to multiple parties. MPCircuits creates a new end-to-end tool-chain to facilitate practical scalable MPC realization. To illustrate the practicality of MPCircuits, we design and implement a set of five circuits that represent real-world MPC problems. Our benchmarks inherently have different computational and communication complexities and are good candidates to evaluate MPC protocols. We also formalize the metrics by which a given protocol can be analyzed. We provide extensive experimental evaluations for these benchmarks; two of which are the first reported solutions in multi-party settings. As our experimental results indicate, MPCircuits reduces the computation time of MPC protocols by up to 4.2x.

Category / Keywords: implementation / Multi-party computation, secure function evaluation, logic synthesis, secure auction, secure voting, private-set intersection, stable matching, nearest-neighbor search

Date: received 8 Mar 2019

Contact author: sadeghriazi at gmail com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: To appear in Hardware Oriented Security and Trust (HOST) 2019

Version: 20190312:120026 (All versions of this report)

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