Paper 2019/262
Revisiting Post-Quantum Fiat-Shamir
Qipeng Liu and Mark Zhandry
Abstract
The Fiat-Shamir transformation is a useful approach to building non-interactive arguments (of knowledge) in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, existing proof techniques are incapable of proving the security of Fiat-Shamir in the quantum setting. The problem stems from (1) the difficulty of quantum rewinding, and (2) the inability of current techniques to adaptively program random oracles in the quantum setting. In this work, we show how to overcome the limitations above in many settings. In particular, we give mild conditions under which Fiat-Shamir is secure in the quantum setting. As an application, we show that existing lattice signatures based on Fiat-Shamir are secure without any modifications.
Metadata
- Available format(s)
- Category
- Foundations
- Publication info
- Preprint. MINOR revision.
- Keywords
- quantumFiat-ShamirsignatureSIS
- Contact author(s)
- qipengl @ cs princeton edu
- History
- 2019-03-06: received
- Short URL
- https://ia.cr/2019/262
- License
-
CC BY
BibTeX
@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/262, author = {Qipeng Liu and Mark Zhandry}, title = {Revisiting Post-Quantum Fiat-Shamir}, howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2019/262}, year = {2019}, url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/262} }