Revisiting Post-Quantum Fiat-Shamir

Qipeng Liu and Mark Zhandry

Abstract

The Fiat-Shamir transformation is a useful approach to building non-interactive arguments (of knowledge) in the random oracle model. Unfortunately, existing proof techniques are incapable of proving the security of Fiat-Shamir in the quantum setting. The problem stems from (1) the difficulty of quantum rewinding, and (2) the inability of current techniques to adaptively program random oracles in the quantum setting. In this work, we show how to overcome the limitations above in many settings. In particular, we give mild conditions under which Fiat-Shamir is secure in the quantum setting. As an application, we show that existing lattice signatures based on Fiat-Shamir are secure without any modifications.

Available format(s)
Category
Foundations
Publication info
Preprint. MINOR revision.
Keywords
quantumFiat-ShamirsignatureSIS
Contact author(s)
qipengl @ cs princeton edu
History
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/262

CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/262,
author = {Qipeng Liu and Mark Zhandry},
title = {Revisiting Post-Quantum Fiat-Shamir},
howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/262},
year = {2019},
note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/262}},
url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/262}
}

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