Paper 2019/260

A Modular Treatment of Blind Signatures from Identification Schemes

Eduard Hauck, Eike Kiltz, and Julian Loss

Abstract

We propose a modular security treatment of blind signatures derived from linear identification schemes in the random oracle model. To this end, we present a general framework that captures several well known schemes from the literature and allows to prove their security. Our modular security reduction introduces a new security notion for identification schemes called One-More-Man In the Middle Security which we show equivalent to the classical One-More-Unforgeability notion for blind signatures. We also propose a generalized version of the Forking Lemma due to Bellare and Neven (CCS 2006) and show how it can be used to greatly improve the understandability of the classical security proofs for blind signatures schemes by Pointcheval and Stern (Journal of Cryptology 2000).

Note: Perfect blindness/statistical blindness.

Metadata
Available format(s)
PDF
Category
Public-key cryptography
Publication info
A minor revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2019
Keywords
Blind signatureidentification schemesForking Lemma
Contact author(s)
lossjulian @ gmail com
History
2021-12-17: last of 27 revisions
2019-03-06: received
See all versions
Short URL
https://ia.cr/2019/260
License
Creative Commons Attribution
CC BY

BibTeX

@misc{cryptoeprint:2019/260,
      author = {Eduard Hauck and Eike Kiltz and Julian Loss},
      title = {A Modular Treatment of Blind Signatures from Identification Schemes},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/260},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/260}},
      url = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2019/260}
}
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