Paper 2019/235

Reusable Designated-Verifier NIZKs for all NP from CDH

Willy Quach, Ron D. Rothblum, and Daniel Wichs


Non-interactive zero-knowledge proofs (NIZKs) are a fundamental cryptographic primitive. Despite a long history of research, we only know how to construct NIZKs under a few select assumptions, such as the hardness of factoring or using bilinear maps. Notably, there are no known constructions based on either the computational or decisional Diffie-Hellman (CDH/DDH) assumption without relying on a bilinear map. In this paper, we study a relaxation of NIZKs in the designated verifier setting (DV-NIZK), in which the public common-reference string is generated together with a secret key that is given to the verifier in order to verify proofs. In this setting, we distinguish between one-time and reusable schemes, depending on whether they can be used to prove only a single statement or arbitrarily many statements. For reusable schemes, the main difficulty is to ensure that soundness continues to hold even when the malicious prover learns whether various proofs are accepted or rejected by the verifier. One-time DV-NIZKs are known to exist for general NP statements assuming only public-key encryption. However, prior to this work, we did not have any construction of reusable DV-NIZKs for general NP statements from any assumption under which we didn't already also have standard NIZKs. In this work, we construct reusable DV-NIZKs for general NP statements under the CDH assumption, without requiring a bilinear map. Our construction is based on the hidden-bits paradigm, which was previously used to construct standard NIZKs. We define a cryptographic primitive called a hidden-bits generator (HBG), along with a designated-verifier variant (DV-HBG), which modularly abstract out how to use this paradigm to get both standard NIZKs and reusable DV-NIZKs. We construct a DV-HBG scheme under the CDH assumption by relying on techniques from the Cramer-Shoup hash-proof system, and this yields our reusable DV-NIZK for general NP statements under CDH. We also consider a strengthening of DV-NIZKs to the malicious designated-verifier setting (MDV-NIZK) where the setup consists of an honestly generated common random string and the verifier then gets to choose his own (potentially malicious) public/secret key pair to generate/verify proofs. We construct MDV-NIZKs under the ``one-more CDH'' assumption without relying on bilinear maps.

Available format(s)
Cryptographic protocols
Publication info
A major revision of an IACR publication in EUROCRYPT 2019
Contact author(s)
quach w @ husky neu edu
2019-02-28: received
Short URL
Creative Commons Attribution


      author = {Willy Quach and Ron D.  Rothblum and Daniel Wichs},
      title = {Reusable Designated-Verifier NIZKs for all NP from CDH},
      howpublished = {Cryptology ePrint Archive, Paper 2019/235},
      year = {2019},
      note = {\url{}},
      url = {}
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