Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2019/222

(R)CCA Secure Updatable Encryption with Integrity Protection

Michael Klooß and Anja Lehmann and Andy Rupp

Abstract: An updatable encryption scheme allows a data host to update ciphertexts of a client from an old to a new key, given so-called update tokens from the client. Rotation of the encryption key is a common requirement in practice in order to mitigate the impact of key compromises over time. There are two incarnations of updatable encryption: One is ciphertext-dependent, i.e. the data owner has to (partially) download all of his data and derive a dedicated token per ciphertext. Everspaugh et al. (CRYPTO'17) proposed CCA and CTXT secure schemes in this setting. The other, more convenient variant is ciphertext-independent, i.e., it allows a single token to update all ciphertexts. However, so far, the broader functionality of tokens in this setting comes at the price of considerably weaker security: the existing schemes by Boneh et al. (CRYPTO'13) and Lehmann and Tackmann (EUROCRYPT'18) only achieve CPA security and provide no integrity protection. Arguably, when targeting the scenario of outsourcing data to an untrusted host, plaintext integrity should be a minimal security requirement. Otherwise, the data host may alter or inject ciphertexts arbitrarily. Indeed, the schemes from BLMR13 and LT18 suffer from this weakness, and even EPRS17 only provides integrity against adversaries which cannot arbitrarily inject ciphertexts. In this work, we provide the first ciphertext-independent updatable encryption schemes with security beyond \CPA, in particular providing strong integrity protection. Our constructions and security proofs of updatable encryption schemes are surprisingly modular. We give a generic transformation that allows key-rotation and confidentiality/integrity of the scheme to be treated almost separately, i.e., security of the updatable scheme is derived from simple properties of its static building blocks. An interesting side effect of our generic approach is that it immediately implies the unlinkability of ciphertext updates that was introduced as an essential additional property of updatable encryption by EPRS17 and LT18.

Category / Keywords: updatable encryption, integrity, key rotation, ciphertext-independence

Original Publication (with major differences): IACR-EUROCRYPT-2019

Date: received 25 Feb 2019, last revised 28 Feb 2019

Contact author: michael klooss at kit edu, andy rupp@kit edu, anj@zurich ibm com

Available format(s): PDF | BibTeX Citation

Note: This is the full version.

Version: 20190228:143155 (All versions of this report)

Short URL: ia.cr/2019/222


[ Cryptology ePrint archive ]